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In the Western  United  States,  widespread  growth  of wind  and  solar  resources  is  putting  pressure  on  state
policy makers,  electricity  system  operators,  and  utilities  to integrate  renewable  resources  into  the  grid,
while maintaining  reliability,  affordability,  and improving  efﬁciency.  These  resources  are  creating  new
challenges  because  their  variability  can  contribute  to transmission  constraints  and  system  imbalances.
This  paper  examines  a recent  initiative  to make  energy  imbalance  market  services  available  throughouteywords:
nterorganizational collaboration
enewable energy
estern electricity grid
nergy imbalance market
the  Western  Interconnection  and  provides  insight  into  evolving  electricity  system  governance.  Drawing
on  boundary  organization  and  interorganizational  collaboration  literature,  this  research  explores  the
processes  and  practices  used  to create  a new  interorganizational  collaboration.  The  research  supports
theoretical  claims  that  facilitating  policy  innovation  requires  discursive  formation  of a  collective  identity.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
oundary organization
. Introduction
In many countries the widespread growth of wind and solar
lectric generation is changing how electricity systems are planned
nd operated. Policymakers, planners, and grid operators seek to
ntegrate variable renewable resources while maintaining system
eliability and affordability. These actors need to innovate organiza-
ionally to advance both regional integration and decarbonization,
hich can be difﬁcult [1,2]. At base, these challenges are ones of
overnance, and approaches to meeting them have varied across
ountries and regions in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East and
orth Africa [3–10]. This study of an innovative approach in the
estern United States provides insight into these regional gover-
ance challenges.
In the United States more than 64 GW of wind and 10 GW of solar
apacity accounted for 7% of net summer capacity [11]. The vari-
bility of these renewable resources can contribute to transmission
onstraints and system imbalances. In response to this variability,
n the short term, grid operators can ramp up ﬂexible resources, if
vailable, or curtail wind generator production to reduce output. In
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: stephanielenhart@u.boisestate.edu
S. Lenhart), nelsonma@up.edu (N. Nelson-Marsh), ewilson@umn.edu (E.J. Wilson),
avidsolan@boisestate.edu (D. Solan).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.05.015
214-6296/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article 
/).license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
the longer term, they can expand the system’s geographic footprint,
develop more ﬂexible resources, or build additional transmission
capacity. As renewable resources have become a larger part of the
system, curtailments of wind and solar have increased. For exam-
ple, in recent years some regions have curtailed from 1 to 4% of wind
generation while Texas curtailed as much as 17% of wind genera-
tion [12]. Resource curtailment affects the economics of wind and
solar development and can stymie progress toward policy goals.
This situation is not unique to the United States, and world-
wide many different organizations are evolving new and innovative
approaches to better integrate renewable energy into electricity
systems [13]. However, in the United States, multiple overlapping
jurisdictions, legacy operations, and fractured electricity system
governance have made wind and solar integration especially chal-
lenging. Historically, the U.S. electricity system has been “highly
balkanized relative to most other countries” [14]. While state or
regional electricity markets now coordinate 70% of wholesale elec-
tricity trades [15], across the western states, energy federalism
continues to shape decentralized decision-making and coordina-
tion has often been fractious. For example, while most of California
participates in a wholesale energy market operated by the Cal-
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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fornia Independent System Operator (CAISO),1 the rest of the
estern Interconnection2 has opposed joining federally autho-
ized regional transmission organizations (RTOs) like CAISO and
s managed through 37 other balancing authorities.2 The balancing
uthorities are traditionally regulated and lack dynamic mecha-
isms to respond to energy imbalances or congestion. Within this
nstitutionally and jurisdictionally complex system, policies and
arket designs determine the mix  of generating resources, loca-
ion of transmission assets, whether conventional or renewable
esources are curtailed, and the extent to which alternative tools
or maintaining system balance are available.
The expansion of renewable resources in the Western United
tates has, in turn, increased pressure on utilities and energy system
lanners to improve renewable resource integration while main-
aining reliability, affordability, and improving system efﬁciencies.
tate renewable energy policy goals, coupled with decreasing
osts of renewable technologies, have supported the installation
f approximately 75 GW of wind and solar across the West [16].
t has also led some industry leaders and policy makers in the
est to explore new approaches for regional electricity system
overnance. In the Western Interconnection, expansion of regional
lectricity markets would increase efﬁciency, reduce current and
nticipated curtailments, and facilitate renewable resource inte-
ration through automated economic dispatch and access to larger
eographic regions [17–24]. However, regionalization will alter the
istribution of beneﬁts and burdens among stakeholders and the
olitical and institutional challenges require more coordination,
olicy innovation, and new institutional paradigms of electricity
ystem governance.
The recent CAISO initiative to make energy imbalance mar-
et (EIM) services available to balancing authorities throughout
he Western Interconnection is changing electricity system gover-
ance in critical ways. Typically Western balancing authorities have
elied on bilateral electricity contracts instead of real-time energy
arkets. The EIM will extend the real-time energy market out-
ide of California while allowing Western-balancing authorities to
aintain a level of autonomy from Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
ission (FERC) jurisdiction and the CAISO market. The EIM provides
articipating balancing authorities and CAISO with greater efﬁ-
iency and ﬂexibility through real-time automated and economic
ispatch, improved communications, increased system visibility,
ccess to additional ﬂexible reserves, and sharing of resources.
xpansion of the EIM to PaciﬁCorp, the ﬁrst balancing authority to
articipate, started live operation on November 1, 2014. NV Energy
egan participating in December 2015 and Puget Sound Electric
nd Arizona Public Service Company signed agreements to join
n 2016 (Fig. 1).3 However, important questions of long-term EIM
overnance remain.
The EIM is being implemented through a newly emerging
nterorganizational collaboration among CAISO, incumbent CAISO
takeholders, new EIM participants, and other entities in the
estern Interconnection. An interorganizational collaboration is
 distinct organizational form in which members organize around
ocial problems or opportunities for innovation to leverage differ-
nce in knowledge, skills, or resources and to accomplish objectives
hat could not be realized alone [25–27]. The emerging EIM
overnance structure is a particular type of interorganizational col-
aboration, referred to as a boundary organization, in which policy
1 List of Acronyms: CAISO—California Independent System Operator; EIM—Energy
mbalance Market; FERC—Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; PUC—Public Util-
ty Commission; RTO—Regional Transmission Organization.
2 For deﬁnition see Table 1.
3 In November 2015 and in April 2016, Portland General Electric and Idaho Power,
espectively, announced their intent to join CAISO’s Energy Imbalance Market.ocial Science 19 (2016) 94–107 95
and technical-scientiﬁc domains co-mingle [28,29], and the multi-
ple tensions among diverse stakeholders are negotiated through a
dynamic process of continuous negotiation [28].
A fundamental issue for boundary organizations that rely on
voluntary participation is how to achieve collective action. CAISO
is extending its market infrastructure, but participation in the
EIM is voluntary. CAISO must engage with and be responsive
to stakeholders and delegation of CAISO authority is a central
implementation question. The nature of the EIM depends on the
interaction among incumbent and new stakeholders and their
willingness to participate in collective action. Interorganizational
collaboration literature suggests that collective identity can moti-
vate collective action because it provides a rationale for cooperation
and creates the legitimacy needed to enable action [25]. Collective
identity is particularly important for collective action in volun-
tary collaborations where hierarchical and economic authority is
limited [25,26].
Traditional research on boundary organizations and collective
identity often conceptualizes interactions as seeking lasting stabil-
ity among stakeholder demands [27–30] and identity as forming
around central, enduring, and distinctive attributes [31]. However,
given the pressing need for energy governance arrangements to be
dynamic, rather than static [32], the contingency of technological
development [33], and our interest in the process of governance
transition in the Western Interconnection, we  draw on a growing
literature that focuses on the tension and ﬂuidity in both collec-
tive identity and boundary organizing [25,26,34–36]. This literature
is grounded in a discursive perspective, which focuses on how
collective identity is produced and reproduced through conversa-
tions, recognizes the contextual and temporal nature of boundary
organizing, shifts attention from assessing beliefs, and allows the
researcher to focus on how change occurs in practice. Further-
more, our approach and ﬁndings directly address some of the “most
promising avenues” as identiﬁed by Sovacool: communication and
persuasion, geography and scale, and institutions and energy gov-
ernance. In particular, by examining a newly emerging governance
structure this study contributes to answering, How “have the cen-
tral principles of governing energy shifted?” [37].
The purpose of this study is to conceptualize the context of
evolving electricity system governance in the Western United
States using a model of discourse and collaboration as a theoret-
ical framework for explanation. We  develop a longitudinal case
study of the formation of the EIM Transitional Committee. This
committee is an initial and temporary governance structure for the
EIM. Using document analysis, interviews and ﬁeld observations
we explain the boundaries that contributed to the previous lack of
organized markets in the Western Interconnection and we trace the
emergence of the EIM Transitional Committee and a new collective
identity.
This study extends the literature on collective identity and
interorganizational collaboration to the context of boundary orga-
nizations by demonstrating how discursive practices and strategies
can constitute the collective identity of an emerging boundary orga-
nization. This study demonstrates how discursive practices that
maintain a space for both agreement and dissent contribute to for-
mation of a dynamic collective identity. Furthermore, this study
demonstrates how the discursive strategy of abstraction can be
used to normalize dissensus and thereby, allow a collective identity
to form by orienting stakeholders to diverse understandings of an
issue and preserving participation of multiple voices. Finally, this
study explains the tensions in the Western Interconnection that
prevented previous efforts to introduce organized markets from
succeeding, how the growth of renewable resources has put pres-
sure on legacy governance institutions, and the strategies that have
contributed to change.
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Fig. 1. Energy imbalance market participating balancing authorities.
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The next section provides background on electricity governance,
he role of CAISO, and the basic concept for the EIM. Section 3
eviews the boundary organization and interorganizational collab-
ration literature that provide the analytical framework for our
nalysis. Section 4 describes our case study methods and data. Sec-
ion 5 presents the details of our case and ﬁndings. Finally, Section
 provides a discussion and conclusions.
. BackgroundThe integration of renewable resources is a challenge to grid
perators throughout the world [3–8], with no one-size-ﬁts-all
olution [4]. Integration requires grid operators to change howx.
resources are dispatched and balanced. This is more efﬁcient across
larger geographic regions and regions with non-correlated vari-
able resources [17–24]. In the Western United States renewable
resource integration has proven especially challenging because the
Western Interconnection is connected through sub-regional bal-
ancing authorities, planning organizations, and bilateral contracts,
but it lacks the type of regional electricity system governance for
the transmission grid that is provided in other parts of the United
States by RTOs (Table 1).In 1996 FERC authorized independent system operators (ISOs)
and later, regional transmission organizations to facilitate market
competition while maintaining grid reliability and streamlining
S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107 97
Table  1
Western Interconnection Electricity Regulatory and Planning Organizations.
Note: Shaded rows have some level of CAISO oversight authority.
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ystem planning.4 RTOs are voluntary organizations that plan
or the electricity system, ensure bulk power system reliability,
perate wholesale energy markets, and centrally and dynami-
ally dispatch generation. Decisions made by RTOs shape billions
f dollars in investments and market revenues and shape the
uture of the energy system in critical ways. To participate in an
TO, transmission owners transfer operational control of transmis-
ion facilities to the RTO who is then responsible for providing
on-discriminatory access to transmission. In the United States,
pproximately 70% of bulk power electricity trades are managed
y RTOs [15].
CAISO was authorized in 1996 to facilitate restructuring of trans-
ission, generation, wholesale, and retail services in California.5
AISO now operates the transmission grid for about 80% of Cal-
fornia electric load (about 35% of the Western Interconnection
lectric load) and administers a wholesale energy market that
rovides day-ahead, hour-ahead, and real-time imbalance market
ervices [38]. Unlike other RTOs, the CAISO Board of Governors is
ot elected by members, but is appointed by the Governor of Cali-
ornia. Another difference from other RTOs is that CAISO does not
ave a formal committee structure based on sector representation.
or example, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator has
n Advisory Committee that includes elected representative from
en sectors deﬁned by industry function (e.g., transmission own-
rs) or interest (e.g., public consumers or environmental groups).
n contrast, CAISO uses ad hoc stakeholder engagement processes
o address priority issues in a relatively ﬂat structure, with stake-
older meetings open to all interested parties, oral and written
omments, and no voting.
CAISO is the only FERC-authorized RTO in the U.S. portion of
he Western Interconnection. Outside of CAISO, Western balanc-
ng authorities respond to supply and demand imbalances in real
ime, but there are no market mechanisms to coordinate or opti-
ize this response across balancing authorities. Energy transfers
etween balancing authorities are ‘static’ and primarily managed
hrough standard one-hour schedules with transfers held constant
ver the time period [39].6 Compared to the 15-min scheduling
nd 5-min dispatch intervals in CAISO, other Western balancing
uthorities are less operationally ﬂexible. While this is less efﬁcient
han market mechanisms, it did not create an operational problem
hen the system relied on conventional dispatchable resources,
ike coal, nuclear, natural gas or hydro, which are predictable and
ontrollable. However, variable wind and solar resources demand
ncreased operational ﬂexibility.
Fig. 2 illustrates the differences between separate balancing
uthorities, an EIM, and CAISO and the arrows show access to dif-
erent types of markets. Separate balancing authorities must each
anage energy imbalances independently; whereas, the EIM is a
echanism that uses CAISO’s market services to manage real-time
nergy imbalances across a region. EIM-participating balancing
uthorities do not have access to the CAISO day-ahead or ancillary
ervices markets. Participation in the EIM is voluntary and there
s no exit fee. Implementation costs are negotiated between CAISO
nd each EIM entity. EIM balancing authorities retain functional
nd planning control over their transmission systems and retain
esponsibility for compliance, reserve, and capacity requirements.
4 For the purposes of this paper we will use RTOs to denote both RTOs and ISOs.
5 Retail restructuring in California has been limited following the 2001 energy
risis. Approximately 0.08 of total retail sales in California are from entities with an
wnership classiﬁcation of ‘retail power marketer’ [14].
6 Although 15-min scheduling has been established in many Western Intercon-
ection balancing authorities in accordance with FERC Order 764, the region has not
eveloped a robust sub-hourly energy market [78].ocial Science 19 (2016) 94–107
Signiﬁcant technical work has been completed and continues
on the EIM market mechanisms and a Transitional Committee is
deliberating questions of governance. As of May  2015, four balanc-
ing authorities had reached agreements with CAISO to participate
in the EIM: PaciﬁCorp, NV Energy, Puget Sound Electric, and Ari-
zona Public Service (Table 2). The EIM is anticipated to reach eight
states by the end of 2016: Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington,
Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming.
3. A theoretical model of boundary organizational
collaboration
Increasingly, organizations in various sectors are developing
interorganizational collaborations to share scarce resources, reach
larger audiences, enter new markets, and foster innovation. The
EIM is being implemented through a newly emerging collaboration
among CAISO, incumbent CAISO stakeholders, new EIM partic-
ipants, and other entities in the Western Interconnection. This
collaboration requires ongoing collective action to implement tech-
nical market mechanisms, establish a governance structure, and
negotiate the dynamic operation of an organized electricity mar-
ket. To extend understandings of the complexity and potentials for
success in voluntary collaborations among diverse and competing
interests, we draw on boundary organization and interorganiza-
tional literature.
3.1. What is a boundary organization?
Traditionally boundary organizations were understood as
spaces to negotiate the boundary between policy decision making
and scientiﬁc or technical discretion [27], but today this concept
has grown to include a broader range of institutions and bound-
aries including politics, economics, culture, and science [49]. We
add electricity to this mix. A boundary organization is a partic-
ular type of interorganizational collaboration that goes beyond
bridging organizational boundaries to engaging in the ongoing
work of negotiating a contingent boundary [34]. Boundary orga-
nizations serve diverse organizations by allowing them to pursue
collaboration while maintaining legitimacy [27,30]. Electricity gov-
ernance arrangements, like CAISO and the newly emerging EIM
governance structure, are natural boundary organizations. First,
RTOs act as boundary organizations because they are inter-sector
spaces of collaboration where at least two  stakeholder organiza-
tions meet periodically face-to-face for planning, recommendation
development, decision-making, and taking action on decisions
made [30]. To promote efﬁcient and reliable markets, these orga-
nizations operate on a regional scale. This scale crosses traditional
jurisdictional and organizational boundaries and brings together
transmission owners, investor-owned utilities, publicly-owned
utilities, generators and marketers, alternative energy providers,
state regulators and policy makers, environmental organizations,
consumer ratepayer advocates, and industry associations.
Second, boundary organizations exist to develop policies and
practices that beneﬁt the variety of stakeholders involved [50]. This
too, is a characteristic of RTOs and the EIM governance structure.
By bringing together stakeholders that would otherwise occupy
distinct organizational spaces, boundary organizations purpose-
fully introduce a variety of perspectives and rationalities for best
practices [27,28]. As Crona and Parker [50] state, boundary organi-
zations “broker or mediate interactions across a border of diverse
purposes, incongruent values, and potential mutual incomprehen-
sion.” In other words, as boundary organizations, these regional
electricity governance structures act as ﬂattened organizational
spaces that facilitate collaboration across traditional boundaries by
bringing together multiple perspectives to innovate new ways of
S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107 99
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nowing a problem and creating better solutions than any of the
nstitutions would have reached by acting alone [30].
While much of the boundary organization literature draws
ttention to the aspects of collaboration that involve creating
utual or shared understanding or a consensus (e.g., an agreement
s to how policy implementation will occur) [30], the interor-
anizational collaboration literature suggests the need to think
f collaboration as involving both consensus and dissensus com-
unication [26,51–53]. Consensus meaning shared experiences
nd dissensus meaning exploring of diverse perspectives. Both are
nherent and necessary in interorganizational collaboration and
or the implementation of policy by boundary organizations. We
emonstrate the dynamic nature of boundary work by drawing on
nterorganizational collaboration theory to examine what collabo-
ation looks like in practice..2. Interorganizational collaboration and boundary organizing
The boundary organization literature highlights the EIM gover-
ance structure as a particular type of cooperative organizational the western interconnection. Adapted from Ref. [40].
arrangement. The interorganizational collaboration literature
expands our understanding of how collaboration occurs. As Gray
(1989) notes, collaboration “is a process through which parties who
see different aspects of the problem can constructively explore
their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their
own limited vision of what is possible” [54]. The interorganiza-
tional collaboration literature adds four features. First, stakeholders
need to be interdependent or require each other for implementa-
tion. Second, stakeholders must own  decisions collectively or have
an invested interest in the decisions. Third, members must share
responsibility for the future direction of the interorganizational or
boundary organization domain. Fourth, the interorganizational col-
laboration process is dynamic and emergent and cannot be codiﬁed.
To understand how these features operate in practice, we draw
on Hardy, Lawrence and Grant’s model of collective identity and
interorganizational collaboration [25]. Hardy et al. explain key
communicative or discursive forms that structure a collaborative
boundary organization environment and help identify the elements
and processes that lead to formation of collective identity and
successful collaboration. The beneﬁt of this theoretical model is
100 S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107
Table 2
Comparison of CAISO and Participating EIM Balancing Authorities.
CAISO Arizona Public Service NV Energy PaciﬁCorp Puget Sound Energy
Structure 501(c)(3) nonproﬁt
authorized by FERC
Tariff and California
State Statute
Pinnacle West Capital
Corporation Utility
Berkshire Hathaway
Investor Owned Utility
Berkshire Hathaway
Investor Owned Utility
Puget Energy Investor
Owned Utility
States Served California and Nevada Arizona Nevada California, Idaho,
Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and
Wyoming
Washington
Customers Approx. 30 million 1.2 million 1.34 million 1.8 million 1.0 million
Capacity 65,226 MW 9,187 MW 6,124 MW 10,595 MW 6,522 MW
Sourcesa wind 9% 1% 2% 8% 7%
solar  7% 4% 1% <1% 0%
hydro  15% 0% 4% 5% 41%
geothermal 2% <1% 6% <1% 0%
nuclear 5% 13% 1% 0% 2%
coal  <1% 21% 25% 63% 24%
natural gas 61% 61% 60% 14% 25%
other  3% <1%% 0% 9% 1%
Sources: [41–48].
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ata  is electricity delivered September 2013–September 2014 aggregated from da
uget  Sound Energy is electricity delivered in 2013.
hat it provides a practical focus. Hardy et al. illustrate how par-
icipants leverage differences, produce and innovate synergistic
olutions, and balance divergent stakeholder concerns by basing
heir model on communication-in-action, also known as a dis-
ursive approach to collaboration. A discursive approach focuses
n everyday communication including language use, to under-
tand how conversations emerge and how these conversations are
egotiated by participants in ways that increase or decrease partic-
pation [52,55]. A discursive approach also emphasizes the dynamic
ature of collaboration which is an iterative, social accomplishment
hat emerges over time [25]. Thus, the focus is not on what stake-
olders think, but on how they communicate because what people
ay and do in conversation generates collective outcomes. Finally, a
iscursive approach enables researchers to focus on various levels
f interaction, for example within an organization or at a broader
ocietal level, and explore interrelationships among these levels.
his enables researchers to understand how different kinds of rela-
ionships impact the formation of collective identity, collaboration,
nd policy innovation over time. Therefore, our research examines
oth the context of the prevailing regional discourse about elec-
ricity governance in the West and the discursive strategies used
o facilitate stakeholder discussions of EIM governance within the
IM Transitional Committee deliberations.
The premise of effective collaboration for Hardy et al.  [25]
enters around the idea “that discursive practices produce collec-
ive identities, which lead to various forms of collective action,
otentially including effective collaboration.” A collective identity
ecomes the symbolic glue that keeps participants focused on why
hey are there and what they have in common, particularly in times
f conﬂict and dissensus [25,51,52]. In boundary organizations,
ike RTOs, constructing a collective identity is fundamental due to
he absence of traditional organizational characteristics like hier-
rchical relationships. Collective identity provides a rationale for
ooperation and collaboration in the place of traditional organiza-
ional controls.
Hardy et al.’s model [25] describes two stages important in
xamining the role of collective identity in interorganizational
ollaboration. The ﬁrst stage focuses on how different types of con-
ersations produce collective identity. The second stage examines
ow collective identity is translated through further conversations
nto innovative and synergistic action. Given our focus on the emer-acity for the ISO; APS data is estimated 2014 MW contribution at peak; NV Energy
 Sierra Paciﬁc and Nevada Power; PaciﬁCorp data is electricity delivered in 2013;
gence of a new interorganizational collaboration and its role as a
boundary organization, we adapt this model (Fig. 3).
There are two  types of conversations that are fundamen-
tally important to the creation of a collective identity [25]. First,
researchers need to pay attention to conversations that produce
generalized membership ties that connect participants to a com-
mon  problem or issue around which the collaboration is organized.
Examples of conversations that contribute to formation of gener-
alized membership ties might include characterizations or causes
of problems, rationales for action, or possible solutions. These
conversations are important because they establish a common
understanding of issues as important to stakeholders, warrant an
investment in collective action, and contribute to the discursive for-
mation of collective identity [25]. Second, researchers need to pay
attention to conversations that produce particularized membership
ties within the interorganizational collaboration. These conversa-
tions connect stakeholders to one another rather than to an issue
and might involve discussions of status, afﬁliations, or tasks asso-
ciated with a particular role. The production of particularized ties
also involves clarifying patterns of interaction such as who attends
what meetings and why, how they attend (face-to-face or at a dis-
tance), and who  has been granted the authority to speak for the
collective [25,56]. For example, many RTOs have deﬁned concepts
of sector membership and employ various conﬁgurations of sec-
tor representation, functional committees, and member voting. In
these organizations, sector membership largely deﬁnes particular-
ized membership ties. In contrast, CAISO lacks the concept of sector
membership and instead draws on the expertise and diversity of
stakeholder opinion.
Collective action is made possible through this communicative
construction of a collective identity [26,51]. However, collective
identity does not mean effective collaboration is occurring. Rather,
in the second stage of the model, collective identity is translated
into effective collaboration through other dimensions of conversa-
tions.
Having combined these literatures, we  ﬁrst focus our attention
on the context in the West that has shaped the long-standing polit-
ical and cultural resistance to regionalization. We  are then able to
examine the shift in discourse that led to creation of the EIM. Finally,
using Hardy et al.’s [25] analytical framework this study empirically
applies three propositions regarding the formation of collective
S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Research & Social Science 19 (2016) 94–107 101
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dentity to understand the emergence of a new EIM governance
tructure in the Western United States:
roposition 1. Effective interorganizational collaboration will be
ore likely to ensue when the participants in a collaboration discur-
ively produce a collective identity for themselves.
roposition 2. Participants in an interorganizational collaboration
ill be more likely to discursively construct a collective identity when
hey engage in conversations that establish generalized membership
ies among themselves.
roposition 3. Participants in an interorganizational collaboration
ill be more likely to discursively construct a collective identity when
hey engage in conversations that establish particularized membership
ies among them.
Accordingly, this study was guided by the following research
uestions:
Research Question 1: How did stakeholders conceptualize the
oundary between CAISO and the rest of the Western Interconnection?
Research Question 2: What communicative practices or discursive
trategies did stakeholders use to connect participants to a common
ssue?
Research Question 3: What communicative practices or discursive
trategies did stakeholders use to construct relationships among them-
elves?
Research Question 4: Which discursive texts (objects) refer to the
nterorganizational collaboration and provide a rationale for cooper-
tion (or collective action)?
. Methods
This research uses a case study approach and qualitative meth-
ds to provide insight into how implementation of the EIM
overnance structure is occurring in practice. The purpose of the
esearch is to conceptualize this unique change in energy system
overnance and to provide empirical support of how collectiveaboration adapted from Ref. [25].
identity is formed in interorganizational collaborations. We  achieve
this by applying the analytical framework provided in Hardy et al.
The qualitative methods selected for this research rely on multiple
sources of information and thick description, immersion in the con-
text, and the self-reﬂexivity of the researcher [57,58]. By observing
what people actually do and the discursive practices they engage,
these methods allow us to go beyond description to focus on inter-
pretation of how and why  processes unfolded as they did and the
ways in which communication constructs or constitutes collec-
tive identities [57,58]. The approach responds to calls for energy
research to focus on the human-dimensions of the system, address
questions that are relevant to real world problems, and recognize
the complex contexts, histories, and multiple perspectives within
which the electricity system is embedded [32,37].
The case in this study is deﬁned by the collective action that
occurred around the formation of a new regional governance struc-
ture for the EIM and is bounded by the initial meetings of the
Public Utilities Commission-Energy Imbalance Market Group in
early 2012 through the seating of the EIM Transitional Committee
in May  2014 and the initial experiences of the Committee in work-
ing together. The case does not examine the Committee’s work to
negotiate its recommendation for a long-term governance struc-
ture.
The data for the case study include more than 50 documents
produced for the EIM initiative, 15 h of semi-structured interviews
with 15 stakeholders and 11 in-person, WebEx, and teleconfer-
ence meeting observations conducted between February 2014 and
April 2015 resulting in 304 single-spaced pages of transcripts and
139 single-spaced pages of ﬁeldnotes. The research includes exam-
ination of agendas, presentations, issue papers, straw proposals,
stakeholder comments, stakeholder comment matrices, letter to
the Board of Governors, draft and ﬁnal Transitional Committee
Charter documents, and the FERC Order conditionally accepting
EIM tariff revisions available from the CAISO website (see Supple-
mentary material for a list of all documents). Initial interviews were
selected through purposive sampling [58] to recruit interviewees
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cross the different stakeholder sectors as identiﬁed in other RTOs
nd the CAISO Board nomination process. Subsequent interviews
ere identiﬁed through referrals from interviewees and included
n the study to the extent they achieved our purposive sampling
bjectives. As a group of EIM Transitional Committee members
as named, our sampling criterion expanded to include individuals
articipating on the Transitional Committee. Our interview partic-
pants include former CAISO staff, state regulators, investor owned
tilities, publicly owned utilities, marketers and generators, alter-
ative energy providers, industry associations, and public interest
roups. The interview participants include six members of the EIM
ransitional Committee.
In the stakeholder process communication performances and
ractices occur as an iterative back and forth between meeting
articipation, straw proposals, presentations, written stakeholder
omments, and written responses that act “as aids in speech acts”
58]. The documents analyzed in this study include reports and pre-
entations that provide an accounting of agency and stakeholder
ositions, and primary stakeholder comments and interviews that
rovide ﬁrst-person descriptions of their own communications.
aken together the written stakeholder comments, policy docu-
ents, interviews, and meeting observations allowed us to gain
nsight into the communicative process as it occurs and provides a
easure of triangulation because data from interviews, ﬁeld notes,
nd documents could be compared [58].
Initially we began the research with the broad intention of
nderstanding why some interorganizational collaborations result
n innovation and some do not. Early on it became evident that
takeholders were struggling with questions of collective iden-
ity. We  grounded our subsequent investigations in the literature
elated to discourse, collaboration, and identity. This literature was
sed to formulate research questions and inform our document
eview and interviews. The interviews, written stakeholder com-
ents, and written CAISO responses were systematically analyzed
sing grounded theory and the constant comparative technique
n which meanings and claims are grounded in the codes and
ategories that emerged through cumulative coding cycles and ana-
ytical memo  writing [59,60].
The primary-cycle coding included open, process, and in vivo
oding to fracture the data and identiﬁed tensions around polit-
cal control, cost allocation, risk, affordability, and clean energy
olicy goals. This cycle of coding also identiﬁed the importance
f independence and representation in stakeholder conversations
nd texts. The primary coding cycle resulted in 162 codes. We
hen focused our analysis to trace communication regarding these
ssues over time with focused attention on written comments
nd responses around issues of independence and representation.
ubsequent cycles of coding were conducted to compare and reor-
anize the primary codes according to similarities or patterns to
reate categories that facilitated the analysis of the connections
mong codes and the development of themes, concepts, and claims.
hese cycles of coding drew on theoretical constructs from the lit-
rature and were guided by the research questions for the study.
n these cycles of coding we sought to identify the discursive prac-
ices and strategies stakeholders used to connect participants to
 common issue and directly to each other, as well as, discursive
trategies used to disrupt such connections. We  also sought to iden-
ify self-reﬂexive descriptions of the rationale for collective action,
hich we understood as evidence of collective identity for partic-
pants. Using the coding and analytical memo  writing process, we
dentiﬁed four themes for the analysis: (1) boundaries and inac-
ion, (2) shifts in the context, (3) strategic construction of the scope
nd venue, and (4) an emerging collective identity. Within these
hemes, we developed seven categories and 25 codes that form the
oundation for the claims presented in the following sections.ocial Science 19 (2016) 94–107
5. Energy imbalance market and unique challenges in the
west
The case is presented in the following sections: (1) bound-
aries and inaction in the Western interconnection; (2) discursive
strategies that shifted the context for discourse and opened the
possibility for change; (3) strategic construction of the problem to
narrow the scope of stakeholder communication and distance the
conversations from CAISO processes; and (4) the formation of a new
collective identity around the EIM. Quotes from stakeholder inter-
views are shown as [CAISO-XX] and quotes from written materials
in the stakeholder process as an in-text citation (see Supplementary
material for documents reﬂecting timeline of events).
5.1. Boundaries and inaction in the western interconnection
The conﬂict over organized markets and regional governance
in the West has existed since before FERC ﬁrst authorized RTOs in
1996. Stakeholders in the Western Interconnection have engaged
in multiple failed efforts to form another Western RTO, including
Desert STAR in the southwest and IndeGo, RTO West, and Grid West
in the northwest. A recent study identiﬁed three barriers to creating
either a new Western RTO or an EIM: transmission cost alloca-
tion, governance, and differences in culture [61]. In our analysis, we
focused speciﬁcally on the boundaries between CAISO and the rest
of the Western Interconnection and identiﬁed four tensions have
that lead to resistance and inaction in expanding CAISO organized
market mechanisms in the Western Interconnection.
First, transmission cost allocation and use of existing transmis-
sion rights are critical issues that shaped the original footprint of
CAISO and continue to drive decisions about whether or not to join.
Several stakeholders noted that with the growth of wind and solar
resources, the cost of new transmission capacity has become an
increasing source of tension. One stakeholder explained the tension
around building east-west transmission in the Western Intercon-
nection this way: “. . .what’s in it for us to ﬁnance and rate the
building of all this transmission to get this thing over to Port-
land and California. They have this big sucking sound for all of this
renewable energy; let them pay for transmission” [CAISO-206].
Second, concerns about the economic risks of engaging with
CAISO organized markets and lingering tensions from the 2001
energy crisis continue to have salience in the region. Stakehold-
ers explained that “the energy crisis litigation is still going on”
[CAISO-202], “they just don’t trust California” [CAISO-209], and a
perspective of “Why would I want to be subjected to a market price
that could be off the charts. . Is there really any beneﬁt? I thought
California proved that there was  no beneﬁt.” [CAISO-204].
Third, there is a long-standing political and cultural resistance to
California and FERC which is expressed through a desire for “local
control”, “home grown” solutions, and “anything but California.”
Some of this concern reﬂects fear of California dominating any
regional efforts: “When California sneezes, the rest of the West gets
a cold. That’s reality” [CAISO-212] and resistance to federal regula-
tion: “The biggest boogeyman in the room is FERC. They don’t want
to be FERC jurisdictional. .” [CAISO-213]. However, this also reﬂects
deeply held beliefs, described by one stakeholder as, “. . .something
almost embedded in me,  and I don’t know where it came from, that
it was a bad thing. .” [CAISO-214].
Finally, there is a fundamental tension between the electricity
system values of CAISO and those of other entities in the West-
ern Interconnection. CAISO is perceived as tightly aligned with
California policy making processes and achieving aggressive Cal-
ifornia policy goals, which is in tension with other stakeholders
who express a primary focus on ratepayer affordability. The autho-
rization of CAISO in state statute “binds the ISO to the state in ways
that just doesn’t happen elsewhere” [CAISO-215], inﬂuences how
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t works with other state agencies, and inﬂuences perceptions of its
bility to be independent. As one stakeholder explained:
“California, you know, if you’ve spent any time in California,
it’s like a kind of ‘Alice in Wonderland’ of utility regulations.
Everywhere else in the West, you hear about ‘least cost, least
risk’ and cost is 95 percent of the driver of energy policy on the
part of state commissions in the Western United States, outside
of California. Now in California, a big emphasis unambiguously
is getting as much carbon free generation as possible in their
portfolio.” [CAISO-207]
.2. Opening the possibility for change
Early work to explore a Western EIM, rather than a full RTO,
arked a shift in the broader context of stakeholder interactions
nd an opening to the possibility for change. The Western Intercon-
ection is facing policy, economic, and market opportunity drivers
f change, which are reﬂected in how the EIM as a market mech-
nism is framed in stakeholder interactions. In our analysis we
dentiﬁed three discursive strategies that became important for
hange: (1) the EIM has important differences from and is not an
TO; (2) the EIM can facilitate clean energy goals; and (3) jurisdic-
ional fragmentation is inherently inefﬁcient and out of step with
 modern electricity system.
First, key research institutions and regional governance enti-
ies initiated efforts to explore potential alternatives for integrating
enewable resources and improving market efﬁciency [17–24].
hrough this work, an EIM emerged as an alternative to expand-
ng or creating a new RTO in the Western Interconnection, and it is
ften characterized as not an RTO. For example,
“An EIM must be justiﬁed based on its own  merits without any
expectation of adding other elements typical of RTOs, such as
day-ahead markets, capacity markets, transmission planning,
or transmission expansion cost allocation. There is nothing in
the EIM market design that forces the West to later adopt an
RTO structure” [62].
In 2011, the Western Interstate Energy Board2 funded the Public
tilities Commission (PUC)-EIM Group2 representing public utility
ommissions from eleven Western states.7 This group was  instru-
ental in moving the EIM beyond conceptual conversations. In
arly 2012, the PUC-EIM Group solicited proposals for a Western
IM. CAISO and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) both responded
ith proposals demonstrating the technical feasibility and aggre-
ate system-wide beneﬁts of an EIM. The EIM differs from an RTO in
ays that limit the political and economic risks of regionalization,
llow balancing authorities to preserve autonomy, and maintain
he fundamental aspects of CAISO governance.
Second, the ability for the EIM to integrate variable renew-
ble resources has become an important motivation for change.
he EIM is described as a mechanism that “allows them [Califor-
ia] to accomplish. . a greater penetration of renewable energy”
CAISO-207] or “an efﬁcient way to transfer that energy [over-
eneration from renewable resources in California] to other states
CAISO-211]. Recently, CAISO revised its strategic plan from a focus
n providing cost-effective services, reliability, and transparent
nergy markets [63] to actively working to ‘lead the transition to
enewable energy,’ “reliably manage the grid during industry trans-
ormation,” and “expand collaboration to unlock regional beneﬁts”
64]. In contrast to previous efforts to expand organized markets in
7 The PUC-EIM group also includes a staff member from the South Dakota Public
tility Commission.ocial Science 19 (2016) 94–107 103
the Western Interconnection, the EIM is now aligned with the core
strategies of CAISO.
Third, the legitimacy of arguments against regional integration
is being challenged by a discourse around the lack of moderniza-
tion in the Western Interconnection and the inherent inefﬁciency
of jurisdictional fragmentation. The Western Interconnection is
described as “balkanized” or as a “feudal kingdom” and increasingly
out of step with the “modernization” of the grid. As one stakeholder
described it, “We’re not going to be going back to the base load sys-
tem, and nobody’s going to head back to the idea that more bilateral
contracts are better than the market” [CAISO-215]. The inefﬁciency
of this fragmented system is being framed as a relevant concern
for the jurisdictions that are responsible for protecting ratepayers
and ensuring electricity affordability. For example: “I don’t want
to overstate it, but it is kind of a paradigm change for state com-
missioners. Usually we’re asking whether something a utility did
was ‘prudent’ or “imprudent.” I think we  have to ask ourselves the
question “Is the status quo efﬁcient?” [CAISO-207].
5.3. Narrowing the scope and distancing from CAISO
Following these conceptual conversations and the initial shift in
focus from an RTO to an EIM, stakeholders took a series of actions to
initiate implementation of EIM market mechanisms. These actions
narrowed the scope of issues under discussion and distanced the
stakeholder engagement process from CAISO.
In early 2013, CAISO and PaciﬁCorp entered into a binding
implementation agreement and conducted a joint analysis estimat-
ing annual cost avoided of $10.5 million to PaciﬁCorp customers
and $10.9 million to CAISO customers [65]. Three aspects of the
implementation agreement were important: it provided binding
commitments, was based on a relatively equal sharing of beneﬁts,
and did not address the question of EIM governance. Thus, work
on the technical mechanisms proceeded, stakeholders could see an
example of balancing authority-level costs and the sharing of ben-
eﬁts, and the politically contentious EIM governance question was
deferred, but also deﬁned by the question of how the EIM would be
governed in relation to CAISO.
In March 2013, CAISO management brought the implemen-
tation agreement to their Board of Governors for approval and
initiated a formal EIM stakeholder engagement process. The CAISO-
led process engaged stakeholders in a concrete initiative, opened
up access to specialized knowledge and skills to resolve the com-
plex technical challenges of implementation, and, in the process,
surfaced conﬂicts related to governance. The April 2013 Straw Pro-
posal proposed no transmission charge for EIM use of as-available
transmission. Although this position was challenged, this feature
remained in the EIM design and served to defer the contentious
issue of transmission cost allocation and transmission rights. The
Straw Proposal also presented three models for EIM governance:
(1) a market administrator model that places oversight of the EIM
under the CAISO Board, (2) a market operator model that places
oversight under an independent body, and (3) a hybrid approach.
In reaction to this proposal, stakeholders requested “a more in-
depth discussion” regarding governance issues [66] and CAISO
established a parallel stakeholder process speciﬁcally dedicated to
governance [67].
In August 2013, CAISO initiated the EIM governance stakeholder
process with a white paper that proposed establishing a Tran-
sitional Committee authorized as an advisory committee to the
CAISO Board and charged with developing recommendations for
a long-term independent governance structure. The two-step pro-
cess recognized a need to foster a space for collaboration, while
allowing EIM implementation with PaciﬁCorp to proceed without
delay. Between August and December of 2013, CASIO facilitated
a process to develop a charter for the Transitional Committee
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In the course of the stakeholder process, few changes were made
to the text outlining the nomination and appointment process and
positions of stakeholders did not evolve. This was a political and04 S. Lenhart et al. / Energy Resear
hat focused on two issues: independence and representation. The
ecision to proceed with EIM implementation and to create a
ransitional Committee, narrowed the issues that needed to be
ddressed, allowed new stakeholders to play a more meaningful
ole in the process, and established a separation from CAISO.
“The EIM crosses California borders and extends now soon to
be into seven different states in the West, we have to ﬁnd a
way to accommodate the interests of other regional entities. We
turned the issue over to this Transitional Committee to manage
the stakeholder process. . I think that’s a case where the ISO
[CAISO] wasn’t fully vested in the outcome other than the fact
that it needed to be resolved” [CAISO-211].
.4. Formation of collective identity
The Transitional Committee was established as an advisory com-
ittee to the CAISO Board through authority in the CAISO tariff,
et committee responsibilities and the membership procedures
ere negotiated through the stakeholder process. In these conver-
ations, two issues emerged as important: the text deﬁning the
ndependence of the permanent EIM governance structure and the
omination and appointment procedures for Transitional Commit-
ee members.
.4.1. Abstraction of independence
Throughout the engagement process stakeholders expressed
iverse positions regarding the independence of a long-term gov-
rnance structure. In these conversations there was  a tension
etween stakeholders seeking to enable change and those seek-
ng to sustain stability. The stakeholders seeking change described
ndependence as autonomous of California political control, geo-
raphically representative, and welcoming of new EIM participants.
The CAISO Board of Governors, whose members are appointed by
he governor of California, is not a workable long-term governance
oard for a market whose greater value derives from a wider geo-
raphic footprint” [66]. Or, more simply put: “It can’t be a creature
f California Independent System Operator or no one would join it”
CAISO-215].
In contrast, the stakeholders seeking to sustain stability
escribed independence as being autonomous from a stakeholder
ecision-making entity and supported retaining the status quo. For
xample, “prejudgments about an independent governance struc-
ure separate from the CAISO Board of Governors are unnecessary”
68].
Rather than explicitly accepting or rejecting different constructs
f independence or responding to requests to explicitly deﬁne
cceptable governance options, CAISO repeatedly responded, “The
urrent proposal intentionally avoids prescribing the speciﬁcs of
his future structure to allow such decisions to be informed by the
ork of the Transitional Committee” [69].
In the course of the stakeholder process, the texts reﬂecting the
oncept of EIM governance independence evolved. In the April 2013
traw proposal, CAISO presented three models of governance and
rgued that governance independent of CAISO acting as the admin-
strator “presented fundamental risks to CAISO’s ability to operate
he EIM at a low incremental cost” [70]. The October 2013 draft
f the committee charter deﬁned independence as, “independent
f individual EIM market participants” [71]. The charter language
arallels the FERC requirement for independent RTO governance,
hereby enabling, the possibility, but not requiring, CAISO dele-
ation of authority. While the language explicitly rules out the
ossibility of an EIM governance structure with ﬁnancial ties to
arket participants, it does not prescribe other speciﬁcs of how
he EIM will relate to CAISO, existing CAISO-stakeholders, potential
IM participants, or non-participants in the region. CAISO and otherocial Science 19 (2016) 94–107
stakeholders articulated multiple meanings of independence and
by deferring the issue of what authority, if any, would be delegated
to the new EIM governing body abstracted the idea of indepen-
dence.
5.4.2. Abstraction of representation
CAISO’s proposal to seat Transitional Committee members was
modeled on the procedures used for the CAISO Board. Stakeholders
would be allowed to self-identify in one of the following sec-
tors: investor owned utilities, publicly owned utilities, generators
and marketers, alternative energy providers, EIM participants, and
government agencies and public interest entities.8 However, the
central feature of the nomination and appointment process is that
it is not designed to seat individuals that represent speciﬁc sectors.
This is reﬂected in four aspects of the process. First, the Board is
required to appoint a member nominated by the ﬁrst three EIM
entities to sign implementation agreements. Second, the Board is
required to appoint members based on qualiﬁcations and rank-
ings, but is not required to appoint a member from each sector.
Qualiﬁcations include “support for the success of EIM,” and “ability
and willingness to consider and represent a broad range of per-
spectives” [71]. Afﬁliation with an EIM stakeholder is not required.
Third, nominations are made through stakeholder sectors, but then
consolidated and ranked across all sectors. Finally, the number of
members exceeds the combined number of sectors and EIM par-
ticipating entities. For example, the charter adopted in December
speciﬁed that there would by nine members representing eight
membership positions (seven sectors and one EIM entity).
In response to this proposal, stakeholders expressed diverse
positions regarding representation including suggestions that mem-
bership should represent each sector or should be conditional, for
example, depending on cost-exposure and risks or alternatively
a direct interest in the EIM. Other stakeholders emphasized the
important of inclusive representation. For example, “Key to bring-
ing multiple states and BAs [balancing authorities] into the EIM
will be the degree to which those states and entities view the
governance structure as inclusive of their interests” [69]. A crit-
ical tension occurred around privileging certain stakeholders in
terms of access to the CAISO Board or guaranteed appointments.
The appointment process requires seating up to three EIM entities
with signed implementation agreements.9 In contrast, CAISO load
serving entities are not guaranteed representation. This was char-
acterized as “a telling blind spot to California consumer interests”
[72] given the exposure of these entities to market risks and uplifts
and their inability to exit the market in under two  year.
Rather than revising the nomination and selection procedures,
CAISO repeatedly explained its intent to establish committee mem-
bership based on “. . .a  diverse, well-qualiﬁed, group that can
promote the objectives of a successful EIM” [69]. The commitment
to success is seen as providing “a strong incentive to properly con-
sider all interests rather than elevating any one entity or interest
over another” [66]. Additionally, in response to requests to privilege
certain stakeholder positions, CAISO maintained the importance of
an open and transparent process stating, “The Board, however, can-
not commit to provide any particular level of deference in advance
to any particular proposal, member or subgroup of the Transitional
Committee” [69].8 While the process is similar the sectors used for CAISO Board of Governor nom-
inations are different.
9 This provision was  subsequently amended to create a fourth EIM Entity seat on
the Transitional Committee.
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omewhat contentious process in which CAISO and other stake-
olders articulated diverse and conﬂicting positions. By structuring
he process around qualiﬁcations, diversity, a commitment to EIM
uccess, and open access for any interested stakeholder, CAISO
bstracted the idea of representation. Although the CAISO Board has
iscretion over Transitional Committee member appointments, it is
ritical that the appointments are perceived as legitimate to policy
akers within and outside of California, existing market partici-
ants, potential future market participations, and non-participants.
.4.3. Collective identity: the EIM
The Board approved the Transitional Committee Charter in
ecember 2013, and members of seven nominating sectors
elected and ranked 25 nominations for Board consideration. In
ay  2014, the Board amended the Transitional Committee Charter
o include an additional member and appointed eleven members to
he committee. Subsequently, three additional EIM entity members
ere appointed.10
The appointment of the Transitional Committee marked another
ransition. Stakeholders described the need to balance interests
o achieve success. The Transitional Committee is responsible for,
recommending a governance structure that will be welcoming to
ther utilities in the western United States and still be reassuring
nough to the California legislature and California governance that
he state’s interest, as the very biggest load in the entire system, will
e protected and its consumers will be protected.” [CAISO-215].
Furthermore, stakeholders described the Transitional Com-
ittee as “holding the pen” in developing recommendations, as
mportant in shaping the decision on EIM governance, and are opti-
istic about the potential for success. “This is creative stuff. This is
ame changing stuff.” [CAISO-215].
. Discussion and conclusions
The political context for the CAISO expansion highlights old and
ew tensions. CAISO walks a ﬁne line as it interacts with and bal-
nces power and inﬂuence among new stakeholders as it seeks
egionalization, yet must maintain the involvement and conﬁdence
f California utilities, transmission owners and policy makers. Sim-
larly, state regulators and energy system stakeholders outside of
alifornia are seeking to promote efﬁciency, protect ratepayers and
xpand the market for their resources while limiting perceived
isks. These risks include burdens from transmission cost allocation,
oss of rate stability, loss of local political and operational control,
nd exposure to fundamentally different energy system values and
olicy drivers. The boundaries deﬁned by these risks contributed to
he long-standing inaction around organized markets in the West-
rn Interconnection.
A shift in the context occurred as stakeholders began discussing
n EIM as an alternative to creating a western RTO. Three discursive
trategies became important in creating legitimacy for the initial
ction to move forward with the CAISO-PaciﬁCorp agreement: the
IM is not an RTO, the EIM is fundamental for achieving clean
nergy goals, and the jurisdictional fragmentation of the Western
nterconnection is inherently inefﬁcient and is placing a burden on
atepayers. While not all stakeholders agree with these characteri-
ations of the EIM, these discourses became prevalent and opened
he possibility for change. Additionally, stakeholders that became
irectly involved in the CAISO EIM initiative used these discourses
s resources for action and further conversations.
10 The Transitional Committee Charter was revised in April 2015 to add one
ember from each EIM entity, thus providing a seat for Arizona Public Service.
ubsequently, a seat was provided for Puget Sound Energy.ocial Science 19 (2016) 94–107 105
As the EIM initiative unfolded, stakeholders took three impor-
tant actions that narrowed the scope of issues under discussion and
distanced the stakeholder engagement process from CAISO. First,
the politically contentious question of governance was  deferred
while technical implementation proceeded providing a balancing
authority-level example of the potential distribution of costs and
beneﬁts of EIM participation. Second, the venue for discussions
was distanced from conventional CAISO stakeholder engagement
process by establishing the EIM Transitional Committee as a new
structure for collaboration and engaging in outreach and meetings
throughout the region. Third, the contentious question of trans-
mission cost allocation was  deferred in the initial operation of the
EIM.
To explore how discursive practices and strategies shaped col-
laboration in the newly emerging EIM Transitional Committee, the
analysis empirically applies three propositions from Hardy et al.
[25] describing the role of conversations and collective identity in
collaboration.
First, Hardy et al. [25] argue that conversations that connect
participants to a common issue around which the collaboration is
organized produce generalized membership ties. The analysis of
the EIM Transitional Committee demonstrates that the discursive
strategy of abstraction allowed participating stakeholders to retain
their diverse perspectives and at the same time to connect to the
deﬁned purpose for the EIM Transitional Committee as a common
issue that warrants collective action.
Second, Hardy et al. [25] argue that conversations that develop
participants’ understanding of themselves as tied to each other
directly produce particularized membership ties. The analysis of
the EIM Transitional Committee demonstrates that the discursive
strategy of abstraction was  used to establish the legitimacy of
non-CAISO interests by guaranteeing a seat for EIM entities and
an inclusive requirement accepting all nominees with a speciﬁc
interest in the EIM. Through this political process CAISO worked to
construct a distinct entity that is more that simply a set of repre-
sentatives.
Hardy et al. [25] argue that the discursive construction of col-
lective identity allows participants to construct themselves, the
problem, and the solutions as part of a collaborative framework
in which the potential for joint action is both signiﬁcant and bene-
ﬁcial. We interpret the new orientation around The EIM and claims
by stakeholders about the potential for signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial
collaboration as evidence of an emerging collective identity formed
through a connection to the common purpose of developing rec-
ommendations for a long-term governance structure independent
of individual EIM market participants and acceptance of the Tran-
sitional Committee structure as a meaningful process.
This study demonstrates how discursive strategies, and the
strategy of abstraction in particular, can maintain a space for both
agreement and dissent, encourage participation of multiple voices,
normalize dissensus, and can constitute the collective identity of
an emerging boundary organization.
This study also contributes to the growing literature on the tran-
sition of electricity system governance and the importance of policy
in addition to technology, economics, and ﬁnance. CAISO’s position
in the Western Interconnection is instructive to other countries that
are considering similar integration, market, and transmission plan-
ning issues. These regional governance issues are already evident
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [9], within Europe
[73,74], and connections between Europe, the Middle East, and
North Africa [10] and have far reaching consequences for the future
of electricity systems. The EIM is bridging long-standing resistance
to regionalization of the Western Interconnection, which is criti-
cal for integrating renewable resources. The implementation of the
EIM, through market design and governance structures, will shape
the pace of this transition and determine how beneﬁts and costs are
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hared. Additionally, the EIM is shifting jurisdictional boundaries.
ive other entities have since signed agreements to participate
nd PaciﬁCorp is now considering becoming a full member of the
AISO. The new EIM governance structure will alter the relation-
hips among state and federal regulators and the EIM has opened
iscussions about altering the governance structure of CAISO.
This research is enabled and limited by the focus on a newly
orming interorganizational collaboration and a single case. A case
pproach allows us to conceptualize a context that is intrinsically
nteresting, trace discursive practices over time, provide empirical
pplication of theories, and extend existing theories to a new con-
ext [75–77]. However, the work of the EIM Transitional Committee
s ongoing and further research is needed to assess how the collec-
ive identity of the Transitional Committee evolves, whether it is
ble to accomplish effective collaboration, and whether it is able
o contribute to policy innovation and effective implementation of
olicies to integrate renewables into the electricity system. We  sug-
est further research examining how the EIM collective identity is
ranslated through conversations and how this interorganizational
ollaboration shapes policy implementation.
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